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We use annual Japanese prefecture data on income, population,
demand deposits, and saving deposits from 1992 to 1997 to investi-
gate the issue of whether there exists a stable money demand function
under the low interest rate policy. The evidence appears to support
the contention that there does exist a stable money demand function
with long-run income elasticity greater than one for M2 and less
than one for M1. Furthermore, we find that Japan’s money demand
is sensitive to interest rate changes. However, there is no evidence of
the presence of a liquidity trap.
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In response to the deterioration of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies have been implemented. However, according to
“Highlights of the Budget for Fiscal 2001 (April 2001)” published by the Ministry 
of Finance of Japan, the dependence ratio of the general account of the national 
budget (ippan kaikei) on the issuance of the bonds on an ongoing annual basis has
dramatically increased and reached 38.5 percent in the fiscal 2000 budget, up from
10.6 percent in 1990. On a stock basis, the government’s gross debt relative to GDP
was approximately 135.3 percent in fiscal 2000, the worst level among industrialized
countries (also see Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka [2001]). Has Japan’s fiscal position
deteriorated to an unsustainable level? Bohn (1998) suggests checking this issue in
terms of (1) whether the GDP ratio of the primary balance increases as the GDP
ratio of public debt rises, and (2) whether the GDP ratio of public debt does not
exceed some fixed level. According to his method, both conditions need to be 
satisfied. Doi (2000) has used this method for the Japanese general account from 
fiscal 1956 to fiscal 1998 and found that the conditions for the sustainability of debt
were not met. Given that the sustainability of fiscal debt is uncertain, it is natural
that one might wonder if monetary policy could play a more important role in 
stimulating the Japanese economy. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy
could be affected by many factors. Economists probably would agree that the stability
of the following two relationships is critical. First, is there a stable money demand
function? Second, to what extent is the money supply responsive to the operational
target of the central bank? This paper focuses on the first relationship.
Nakashima and Saito (2000) use monthly aggregate time-series data to analyze
whether nominal prices move inertially when nominal interest rates are extremely 
low in Japan. They find that the real money balance was highly elastic with
respect to the nominal interest rate and real output had no clear impact on real 
money demand in the period between 1995 and 1999. The almost horizontal 
money demand function makes the nominal price level irresponsive to changes in 
the money supply, thus rendering the use of low interest rates to stimulate aggregate
demand ineffective.
In this paper, we use data on 47 prefectures in Japan from 1992 to 1997 to 
study whether there exists a stable money demand function under the policy of 
low interest rates. There are many advantages to using panel data as opposed to using
time-series or cross-sectional data. First, it allows more accurate estimates of 
parameters because it contains many more degrees of freedom and reduces the 
problem of multicollinearity that is often present in time-series data by appealing to
inter-individual differences. Second, it allows a more accurate modeling of dynamic
adjustment behavior with a short time-series. Third, it provides the possibility 
of controlling the impact of omitted variables. Fourth, it provides a possibility of
controlling the impact of structural changes without relying on the conventional tests
of structural breaks that are based on large sample theory with dubious finite sample
properties. Fifth, it allows the possibility of controlling the problem of measurement
errors (e.g., Hsiao [2001]).
2 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/APRIL 2002We present our model in Section II. In Section III, we discuss statistical issues 
in connection with estimating our models. Section IV describes the data. Section V
presents the empirical analysis and compares our results with other studies.
Conclusions and policy implication are in Section VI.
II. The Model
The basic model for our analysis is a combination of the stock adjustment principle
with a money demand equation by households and firms proposed by Fujiki 
and Mulligan (1996). Assuming that an agent chooses the real money balance to
minimize the rental cost subject to a CES-type production function for output and
transaction service, Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) derive a log-linear (desired) money
demand equation of the form
m* it =α i *+b*yit +c*rt +∈ it,    i = 1, . . . ,N (1)
t = 1, . . . ,T,
where m* it denotes the logarithm of the desired real money balance for agent i at 
time  t,  y denotes the logarithm of real income, and r denotes the interest rate. 
The intercept α i * is an approximation of the effects of rental costs of inputs to the
production function of output and transaction service, which may vary acrossi.
The actual logarithm of real money demand, mit, is assumed to follow a stock
adjustment principle,
1
(mit –mi,t–1) = γ *(m* it –mi,t–1) +uit,( 2 )
where γ * denotes the speed of adjustment, which is assumed to be between zero 
and one, and uit is the error term that is assumed to be independently, identically 
distributed across i and over t with mean zero and variance σ
2
u. Substituting equation
(1) into equation (2) yields
mit = (1 – γ *)mi,t–1 +byit +crt +α i +vit,    i = 1, . . . ,N (3)
t = 1, . . . ,T,
where b = γ *b*, c = γ *c*, α i = γ *α i *, and vit = γ *∈ it +uit.
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1. As pointed out by a referee, equation (2) is known as a “real adjustment mechanism” (Goldfeld [1973]). An 
alternative adjustment mechanism in time-series literature is a “nominal adjustment mechanism.” We have 
performed the analysis using the nominal form as well, and the results are similar. Therefore, we only report 
the results in the real term.III. Statistical Issues
A model of the form equation (3) is commonly referred to as a dynamic panel data
model,
mit = γ mi,t–1 + β
∼ ′x ∼ it + α i +vit,   i = 1, . . . ,N (4)
t = 1, . . . ,T,
where γ = (1 – γ *), x ∼ ′it = (yit, rt), β
∼ ′ = (b, c). When the regional-specific effect, α i, is
treated as a fixed constant, it is commonly referred to as a fixed effects (FE) model.
When α i is treated as randomly distributed across i with mean µ and variance σ
2
α , it
is commonly referred to as a random effects (RE) model. 
The advantage of FE specification is that it allows the presence of regional 
differences that can fundamentally differ across regions, and these regional-specific
effects are allowed to be correlated with the included explanatory variables (mi,t–1, x ∼ ′it).
The disadvantage of FE specification is that it introduces the classical incidental 
parameter problem if the time-series dimension, T, is short (e.g., Neyman and Scott
[1948]). The RE specification assumes that the regional differences are random draws
from a common distribution and the observed differences are attributable to chance
outcomes. The advantage of RE specification is that there is no incidental parameter
problem. The disadvantage is that it typically does not allow the correlation between
the regional-specific effect, α i, and x ∼ it. However, it does allow α i to be correlated 
with mi,t–1.
Applying the covariance transformation eliminates the regional specific effect, α i,
from the specification. However, in a dynamic model the usual covariance or within
estimator is biased if T is finite (Anderson and Hsiao [1981, 1982]). To obtain a 
consistent estimator of γ and β
∼ when N is large, we can first take the difference of
equation (4) to get rid ofα i for t = 2, . . . ,T,
∆ mit = γ ∆ mi,t–1 + β
∼ ′∆ x ∼ it +∆ vit,   t = 2, . . . ,T, (5)
i = 1, . . . ,N.
where ∆ = (1 – L), L denotes the lag operator that shifts the observation back by one
period, Lmit = mi,t–1. Although the least squares estimator of equation (5) is incon-
sistent because ∆ mi,t–1 is correlated with ∆ vit. However, lagged mi,t–j, j = 2, . . . , t –1
are uncorrelated with ∆ vit. Therefore, one may apply the instrumental variable (IV)
or generalized method of moments estimator (GMM) to equation (5) (e.g., Ahn and
Schmidt [1995] and Arellano and Bover [1995]).
Although the IV or GMM is consistent, Monte Carlo studies conducted by
Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2001) show that it is subject to serious bias and
size distortion in a finite sample, in particular, if γ is close to one. On the other hand,
the likelihood approach performs remarkably well in a finite sample. However, ∆ mi1
is a random variable and cannot be treated as a fixed constant when T is finite. 
4 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/APRIL 2002To complete the system, we need to add a specification for the initial value,
∆ mi1 = E(∆ mi1|∆ x ∼ i2, . . . , ∆ x ∼ iT) +vi1
T (6)
= g +∑ ∼π ′t∆ x ∼ it +vi1, i = 1, . . . ,N.
t=2
We can apply a minimum distance or maximum likelihood type estimator to the
combined system of equations (5) and (6). The resulting estimator is consistent 
and asymptotically normally distributed as N →∞ and has very good finite sample
properties (Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu [2001]).
When α i is treated as a random variable, there is no incidental parameter 
problem. Therefore, there is no need to take the first difference of equation (4) to
eliminate the individual effect, α i. However, there is still an initial value problem
because mi1 is a random variable and cannot be treated as a fixed constant (e.g., Hsiao
[1986]). To complete the system of equation (4), Bhargava and Sargan (1983) 
suggest the following specification,
mi1 = E(mi1|x ∼ i1, . . . , x ∼ iT) +v* i1
T (7)
= g*+ ∑ ∼π t *′x ∼ it +v* i1.
t =1
Applying the generalized least squares (GLS) or maximum likelihood estimator to
equations (4) and (7) is consistent and asymptotically efficient (Hsiao [1986]).
IV. Data
This section explains the definition of prefectural income statistics, population, and
prefectural money aggregates.
A. Prefectural Income Statistics
Prefectural income statistics compiled by the Economic and Social Research Institute
(the former Economic Planning Agency of Japan) for each fiscal year provide a good
counterpart to national GDP. We downloaded the data from 1987–97 from the
homepage of the Economic and Social Research Institute, and supplemented them
with data for 1985–86 from Fujiki and Mulligan (1996).
The prefectural income data are deflated by the gross prefectural expenditure
deflator during the period from fiscal 1985 to fiscal 1997.
B. Population
We use population to convert prefectural data to per capita data. The population of
each prefecture is as of the beginning of October of each year.
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1. MF1
First, data on demand deposits
2 held by individuals and firms at domestically licensed
bank by prefecture (end of month outstanding) are available from Financial and
Economic Statistics Monthly from the BOJ (hereafter, MF1 data).
3 Due to the 
extension of the number of banks covered that are included in these statistics in April
1989 and occasional consolidation of banks, MF1 data sometimes show an unusual
increase, particularly in April 1989.
4
Since the national M1 statistics are defined as the sum of cash currency in circula-
tion and total demand deposits, net of the deposits held by the financial institutions,
MF1 is the prefectural counterpart of national M1 minus cash. However, the following
caveats are in order. First, MF1 data do not include cash, because regional data on the
amount of currency held by individuals are not available. Second, they do not contain a
breakdown by individuals or firms. Third, they do not include demand deposits at
Shinkin banks, Norinchukin Bank, or Shoko Chukin Bank, which are included in the
computation of M1 statistics. Therefore, the aggregate MF1 is not M1. However, MF1
data explain about 70 percent of M1 during the period from 1985 to 1988, about 
80 percent from 1989 to 1991, and about 70 percent from 1992 to 1997. Therefore, if
we are careful about the sample periods, MF1 predicts an almost constant proportion of
M1, because M1 minus cash is almost proportional to M1 as shown in Figure 1.
2. MF2
The definition of MF2 is the sum of the deposits at domestically licensed banks,
Shinkin banks, and Shoko Chukin Bank. MF2 consists of both demand deposits and
savings deposits. MF2 is our counterpart of national M2+CDs minus cash, with the
existence of the following statistical discrepancies.
5
First, the prefectural breakdown of certificates of deposit (CDs) outstanding does
not exist, hence we ignore it. Second, we only eliminate the deposits held by the
financial institutions for domestically licensed banks, since the breakdown of deposits
held by financial institutions by prefecture is available for domestically licensed banks
only. Third, we exclude the data for Norinchukin Bank from the regional deposit 
statistics to avoid possible double-counting of the same deposits. Again, the aggregate
MF2 is not M2. However, MF2 data explain about 98 percent of M2 during 
the period from 1985 to 1992, about 95 percent from 1993 to 1995, and about 
90 percent from 1996 to 1997. Therefore, if we are careful about the sample periods,
MF2 predicts an almost constant proportion of M2, because M2 minus cash is
almost proportional to M2 as shown in Figure 2.
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2. Substantial parts of demand deposits are either current deposits or ordinary deposits. Current deposits are deposits
that the depositor may demand as freely as his or her needs require. Corporations use this account for the sake of
settlement, but this account does not pay interest. The individuals and corporations with temporary excess funds
mostly hold ordinary deposits.
3. Domestically licensed banks include city banks, regional banks, regional banks II, trust banks, and long-term
credit banks. Note that the location of branches of each financial institution determines the prefecture to which
the deposit belongs.
4. The data before March 1989 do not cover deposits at regional banks II.
5. National M2+CDs adds saving deposits and certificates of deposit to M1. The financial institutions that are
authorized to accept deposits have been allowed to issue CDs since 1979. The interest rate for CDs is not 
regulated, and CDs may be sold to third parties.7



































































































Real M1: With cash
Real M1: Without cash








































































































Real M2: With cash
Real M2: Without cash
Figure 2  Natural Logarithm of Real M2 with and without CurrencyD. Personal Deposits (PDs)
Personal deposits (PDs) are the sum of deposits held by the individuals at domestically
licensed banks, Shinkin banks, post offices, agricultural cooperatives, fishery coopera-
tives, credit cooperatives, and labor credit associations surveyed at the end of March.
The data for the individual deposits are available from the Prefecture Economic
Statistics and Monthly Economic Statistics published by the BOJ.
Two important drawbacks of the personal deposit data are as follows. First, they
do not contain a breakdown of the demand deposits and savings deposits. Second,
they include the deposits of small businesses for the sake of business operations as
long as the deposits are made in the name of an individual.
All MF1, MF2, and PD figures are deflated by the gross prefectural expenditure
deflator and divided by the population in each region to obtain the per capita real
money balance.
V. Empirical Results
In this section, we report the results based on panel data analysis and discuss the 
differences between our findings and findings based on time-series (Nakashima and
Saito [2000]) or cross-sectional analysis (Fujiki [2002]).
We use prefectural data from 1985 to 1997. However, there are a number of data
measurement issues raised for the sample period. First, there was a change in the 
definition of the banks surveyed in the deposit statistics in 1989. Due to an extension
of the coverage of regional banks II in the deposit statistics in that year, the BOJ’s
data in the Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly showed an unusual increase 
in 1989 and the sudden collapse of the economic “bubble” in the early 1990s 
added large savings to the data. Second, there is an argument that people who live 
in suburban areas but work in large metropolitan prefectures—Tokyo, Osaka, or
Kyoto—make their deposits at banks near where they work, instead of where they
live. To avoid the possibility of obtaining biased results because of inconsistent data
measurements in 1989 and 1990, one may just fit equation (3) for the years 1992 to
1997. To avoid the problem of people living in one prefecture but having bank
deposits in other prefectures, we can exclude the data for Tokyo and its neighboring
prefectures Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa from consideration and use the data for
the remaining 43 prefectures to fit equation (3). We can also further exclude Osaka,
Kyoto, and neighboring Hyogo Prefecture from consideration and perform an 
analysis using the data for the remaining 40 prefectures.
First, we note that the change in definitions of the coverage of banks does create
some instability in the estimates. Figure 3 plots the cross-sectional estimates of the
coefficient of lagged dependent variables (log(MF1)) for model equation (3) from
1986 to 1997. There is a significant drop in the coefficient in 1989. However, 
after 1990, it shows remarkable stability over time. Therefore, to avoid possible 
contamination of regression results, we concentrate on estimating the money demand
equation for the period 1992–97, as the period of high interest rates in the early
1990s adds large swings to the data. 
8 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/APRIL 2002Tables 1 and 2 present the GLS estimates of the RE and the minimum distance 
estimation (MDE) of the FE model of MF1 for the 47 prefectures, 43 prefectures, and
40 prefectures, respectively (for details, see Appendices 1 and 2). Tables 3 and 4
present the RE and FE estimation of MF2, respectively. Tables 5 and 6 present the RE
and FE estimation of PD. Practically all the model estimates have the expected signs
and are statistically significant. In particular, the following points are worth noting.
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Figure 3  Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Coefficient of Lagged Dependent
Variables from 1986–97
Table 1  RE Estimation of MF1, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF1 (–1) 0.7135 0.023 0.7058 0.024 0.7274 0.021
Income 0.2785 0.101 0.3526 0.109 0.3603 0.093
Call rate –0.0562 0.004 –0.0538 0.004 –0.0499 0.004
Constant –0.2923 4.139 –0.5321 3.963 –0.6012 4.146
Table 2  FE Estimation of MF1, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF1 (–1) 0.7423 0.022 0.7312 0.021 0.7194 0.017
Income 0.7421 0.082 0.6907 0.078 0.4928 0.073
Call rate –0.0246 0.004 –0.0253 0.003 –0.0362 0.00310 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/APRIL 2002
Table 4  FE Estimation of MF2, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF2 (–1) 0.5728 0.035 0.5821 0.037 0.5260 0.034
Income 0.2267 0.046 0.1989 0.044 0.1342 0.048
Call rate –0.0155 0.002 –0.0164 0.002 –0.0189 0.002
Table 3  RE Estimation of MF2, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF2 (–1) 0.5341 0.028 0.4759 0.036 0.4816 0.040
Income 0.1046 0.051 0.1682 0.060 0.1509 0.064
Call rate –0.0188 0.002 –0.0200 0.002 –0.0204 0.003
Constant 1.2678 1.299 1.2436 1.235 1.2655 1.156
Table 5  RE Estimation of PD, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
PD (–1) 0.5701 0.023 0.5705 0.023 0.5776 0.023
Income 0.0680 0.041 0.0826 0.042 0.0828 0.042
Call rate –0.0276 0.002 –0.0267 0.002 –0.0259 0.002
Constant 1.4446 0.616 1.3940 0.619 1.3611 0.652
Table 6  FE Estimation of PD, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
PD (–1) 0.6572 0.021 0.6737 0.022 0.6117 0.022
Income 0.0710 0.032 0.0987 0.030 0.0374 0.036
Call rate –0.0246 0.002 –0.0234 0.001 –0.0280 0.002




Table 7  Hausman Test of the Presence of Measurement Error
Notes: —: Hausman test statistics are negative.
^ : Call rate is deleted to avoid the singularity problem.
* : Test statistics based on instrumental variable (IV) results.First, the data for Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and their neighboring prefectures probably
contain some systematic measurement errors. Table 7 presents the Hausman specifica-
tion test of the presence of measurement errors by comparing the differences between
the coefficients estimates based on 47 prefectures and 40 prefectures. They appear to
confirm the presence of measurement errors in the seven prefectures we exclude from
consideration. Both the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables and income vari-
ables for the 47 prefectures differ somewhat from the estimates for the 40 prefectures.
However, the coefficients of the interest rate are remarkably stable across estimates
using data for different prefectures, indicating that the substitution effects between
money and other financial assets are not affected by the issue of whether people living
in one prefecture could have bank accounts in a different prefecture.
Second, the income elasticity of money demand is positive and statistically 
significant. Based on the results of using data for 40 prefectures, the short-run
income elasticity for MF1 is about 0.36 for the RE model and about 0.493 for the
FE model. The long-run elasticity is 0.36/(1 – 0.728) = 1.32 for the RE model and
0.493/(1 – 0.719) = 1.75 for the FE model. The short-run income elasticity for MF2
is about 0.151 for the RE model and 0.134 for the FE model. The long-run income
elasticity for MF2 is about 0.29 for the RE model and about 0.28 for the FE model.
The short-run income elasticity for PD is 0.08 for the RE model and 0.037 for the
FE model. The long-run income elasticity is 0.196 for the RE model and 0.1 for the
FE model.
6
Third, the coefficients of the interest rate are negative and statistically significant.
The short-run semi-interest rate elasticity for MF1 is about –0.05 for the RE model
and –0.036 for the FE models. The long-run semi-interest rate elasticity is about –0.18
for the RE model and –0.14 for the FE model. The short-run semi-interest rate 
elasticity for MF2 is about –0.02 for the RE model and –0.019 for the FE model. The
long-run semi-interest rate elasticity for MF2 is about –0.04 for the RE model and
–0.04 for the FE model. The short-run semi-interest rate elasticity for PD is –0.026 for
the RE model and –0.028 for the FE model. The long-run semi-interest rate elasticity
is –0.06 for the RE model and –0.07 for the FE model.
Fourth, there are some differences between the RE and FE estimation, although they
are not substantial. Which model provides a more reliable inference? Unfortunately, 
the Hausman (1978) specification test of RE versus FE specification cannot be 
implemented, because the estimated covariance matrix is negative. Therefore, to check
the reliability of the RE versus FE inference, we rely on the prediction principle (Hsiao
and Sun [2000]). We reestimate the RE and FE models for the period 1992–96 and
use the estimated coefficients to predict the outcomes for 1997. Figures 4–9 plot the
actual and predicted values for the 40 prefectures in 1997. It is quite remarkable how
11
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6. One might argue that since high-net-worth individuals hold large amounts of financial assets such as large savings
deposits, income elasticity of MF2 should be larger compared with MF1. However, our result shows that long-run
income elasticity of MF1 is far larger than that of MF2. One interpretation of this evidence might be that a 
substantial part of demand deposits is held by firms, while savings deposits are presumably held by individuals.
Hence, if our dynamic panel approach is correct, relatively high-income elasticity of MF1 could be due to the
demand for money by firms. The idea is consistent with the evidence that personal deposits, which exclude
deposits made by firms, show the smallest income elasticity of money demand. Information on the distribution of















































































































































































































































































Figure 4  Post-Sample Actual and RE Predicted Values of 1997 MF1 















































































































































































































































































Figure 5  Post-Sample Actual and FE Predicted Values of 1997 MF1 
for the 40 Prefectures13


















































































































































































































































































Figure 6  Post-Sample Actual and RE Predicted Values of 1997 MF2 


















































































































































































































































































Figure 7  Post-Sample Actual and FE Predicted Values of 1997 MF2 



















































































































































































































































































Figure 8  Post-Sample Actual and RE Predicted Values of 1997 PD 



















































































































































































































































































Figure 9  Post-Sample Actual and FE Predicted Values of 1997 PD 
for the 40 Prefectureswell both models predict the outcomes. Table 8 provides the root mean square 
prediction error of these four models. Again the difference is not significant, although
it does appear to favor RE specification slightly.
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Variables RE FE
47 prefectures MF1 0.2464 0.3991
MF2 0.1298 0.0947
PD 0.0577 0.0699
43 prefectures MF1 0.1984 0.3217
MF2 0.0986 0.0802
PD 0.0571 0.0750
40 prefectures MF1 0.2563 0.2396
MF2 0.0928 0.1235
PD 0.0569 0.0875
Table 8  Root Mean Square Prediction Error Comparison
Using the information from the panel data, we find that there appears to be a 
stable relation between Japan’s demand for real balance and real income and the
nominal interest rate, even during the period of low interest rates, whether we use 
an RE or FE specification. Table 9 summarizes the estimated income elasticity and
semi-interest rate elasticity based on data for 40 prefectures. They are of similar 
magnitude between the RE and FE specifications. On the other hand, Nakashima
and Saito (2000), using monthly aggregate time-series data, find that there was a
structural break in 1995 and there did not appear to be a stable relation between
money demand and income for the period 1995 to 1999. Moreover, they find 
that money demand was extremely interest rate-elastic, implying the existence of 
a liquidity trap. Unfortunately, our annual panel data contain too little time 
dimension-related information to directly test for a structural break in 1995.
However, if there was indeed a structural break in 1995, then one would expect that
estimates based on 1992–96 data probably would not predict the outcomes of 1997
well. But Figures 4–9 show that the predictions for 1997 are borne out remarkably
well. This may be viewed as indirect evidence in support of a stable disaggregated
money demand function. Furthermore, although we find that money demand is
responsive to interest rate changes, they are not of the magnitude of Nakashima and
Saito (2000). Their estimated semi-interest rate elasticity for M1 is in the range of
–0.415 to –0.592. Ours is much smaller: the long-run semi-interest rate elasticity for
MF1 is about –0.14 based on the FE model and –0.18 based on the RE model.
Table 9  Estimated Income Elasticity and Semi-Interest Rate Elasticity
Elasticities of interest
MF1 MF2 PD
Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run
Income RE 0.36 1.32 0.15 0.29 0.08 0.196
elasticity FE 0.49 1.75 0.13 0.28 0.037 0.1
Semi-interest RE –0.05 –0.18 –0.02 –0.04 –0.026 –0.06
rate elasticity FE –0.04 –0.14 –0.019 –0.04 –0.028 –0.07Compared to the study that also uses panel data, Fujiki (2002) obtains employee
income elasticities of MF1 of about one, while our estimated short-run income 
elasticity is significantly below one and the implied long-run income elasticity is
above one. However, there is a significant difference in the two model specifications.
First, cross-sectional estimates use a static model while our model is a dynamic one.
Secondly, cross-sectional estimates do not use the call rate as an explanatory variable.
We find that both the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable and the call rate
are highly significant.
A referee has suggested using the gross prefectural product to approximate
regional economic activity because the prefectural income data represent income
received by residents of each specific area, regardless of the location of the economic
activity that generates the income. Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 present the RE and 
FE estimates of a regional MF1 and MF2 demand model using gross prefectural
product instead of gross prefectural income. The results are very similar, again 
appearing to support a stable relationship between disaggregated money demand and
economic activity.
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Table 10  RE Estimation of MF1 Using Gross Prefectural Product 
per Capita (GPPP), 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF1 (–1) 0.6930 0.024 0.6818 0.025 0.7038 0.023
GPPP 0.3101 0.119 0.3850 0.126 0.3511 0.116
Call rate –0.0587 0.003 –0.0571 0.004 –0.0541 0.003
Constant –1.8618 12.591 –2.4640 12.145 –2.2322 11.772
Table 11  FE Estimation of MF1 Using GPPP, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF1 (–1) 0.6935 0.025 0.6998 0.025 0.6816 0.019
GPPP 0.6500 0.116 0.6277 0.113 0.4633 0.097
Call rate –0.0306 0.004 –0.0298 0.003 –0.0428 0.003
Table 12  RE Estimation of MF2 Using GPPP, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF2 (–1) 0.5707 0.026 0.4715 0.040 0.4767 0.045
GPPP –0.0054 0.053 0.1177 0.072 0.0914 0.082
Call rate –0.0202 0.002 –0.0220 0.002 –0.0226 0.002
Constant 1.5367 3.513 0.8552 3.210 1.0357 2.774VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we used Japanese prefectural data from 1992–97 to estimate the money
demand equations. Contrary to the findings relying on an aggregate time-series, we
found that there was a stable money demand equation for Japan even during the
period of low interest rates. Based on the results of the RE dynamic panel data
model, the estimated short-run income elasticity is about 0.493 and the long-run
income elasticity is about 1.32 for MF1, 0.151 and 0.29, respectively, for MF2, 
and 0.08 and 0.196, respectively, for PD. The estimated short-run semi-interest rate
elasticity is about –0.05 and the long-run semi-elasticity is about –0.18 for MF1,
–0.02 and –0.04, respectively, for MF2 and –0.026 and –0.06, respectively, for PD.
The conflicting evidence between the analysis based on aggregate time-series data
and disaggregated panel data could be due to many reasons. First, our analysis is in
fact an analysis of the demand for deposits of various types, because panel data on
holdings of currency are not available. However, in the Japanese economy currency is
widely used, especially by households. Second, there could be an issue of aggregation.
Third, there could be an issue of simultaneity between the aggregate money and
income. Fourth, the most troublesome issue concerning the analysis of aggregate
time-series data is the lack of sample variability. The minimum and maximum 
values of the logarithm are 14.943 and 15.4925 for real GDP, 13.6094 and 17.7069
for real M1, and 14.738 and 15.7089 for real M2, respectively, for the quarterly data
over the period 1980/IV–2000/IV. With sample observations clustered together, 
any regression results are possible depending on the period covered or variability of 
a particular pair of observations. We plan to investigate the discrepancy between 
aggregate and disaggregate time-series in the future. However, if there indeed exists 
a stable real money demand equation, then the following elementary argument 
presumably should hold: “The monetary authorities can issue as much money as they
like. Hence, if the price level were truly independent of money issuance, then the
monetary authorities could use the money they create to acquire indefinite quantities
of goods and assets. This is manifestly impossible in equilibrium. Therefore, money
issuance must ultimately raise the price level, even if nominal interest rates are
bounded at zero” (Bernanke [2000]).
Then why did monetary authorities fail to stimulate aggregate demand and 
prices in the 1990s? If the estimate provides any guidance, it is not because of the
ineffectiveness of the low interest rate policy, but perhaps because the money supply
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Table 13  FE Estimation of MF2 Using GPPP, 1992–97
47 43 40
prefectures prefectures prefectures
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error
MF2 (–1) 0.5520 0.038 0.5494 0.040 0.4879 0.038
GPPP 0.2027 0.061 0.2532 0.060 0.1801 0.064
Call rate –0.0160 0.002 –0.0164 0.002 –0.0196 0.002did not increase as much as desired by the monetary authorities. Figure 10 plots M2
from 1980/I–2000/IV. It is obvious that the growth rate of M2 in the 1990s failed 
to maintain the same rate as in the 1980s. In the 1980s, the average growth rate 
was about 9.34 percent, yet the inflation rate (GDP deflator) was only 1.98 percent
(with a real GDP growth rate of 4.13 percent). In the 1990s, the average growth rate
of M2 was only 2.69 percent, with an inflation rate of 0.14 percent (and a real GDP
growth rate of 1.38 percent). This significant drop in the growth rate of the money
supply was mainly due to the reluctance of commercial banks to make loans to small
and medium-sized enterprises because of the erosion of their capital base due to the
accumulation of nonperforming assets after the economic “bubble” burst in the early
1990s. In fact, the growth rate of high-powered money was about 5.67 percent in the
1990s (compared to 8.08 percent in the 1980s). It is the ineffectiveness of the trans-
mission of the growth of high-powered money to the growth of M2 that led to the
slowdown of growth in the money supply. Moreover, the purchasing of long-term
bonds is likely to push the interest rate further down and money demand is sensitive
to interest rate changes. 
It appears that the challenge faced by the monetary authorities to find a way to
increase the money supply cannot be resolved through monetary means alone.
Complementary fiscal policies must be implemented. If the U.S. experience could be
applied to Japan, the policy option of raising taxes for high-income families may



























































































































Figure 10  Quarterly M2 Data, 1980/I to 2000/IV
Note: M2 is seasonally adjusted.deserve serious study. Raising the taxes of high-income families within bounds may
have a negligible discouraging effect on consumption and investment. After all, the
Clinton administration imposed a 10 percent surcharge on high-income families but
U.S. consumption and investment remained strong in the 1990s. With the increased 
revenue from the income tax surcharge, the government could retire the bad loans
held by financial institutions. Ideally, with their improved balance sheets, commercial
banks would be more willing to lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, and this
would lead to an increase in the money supply and get Japan out of deflation.
However, taxing the wealthy in Japan might mean taxing the elderly, and could 
further discourage consumption if uncertainty regarding the social security system
were an important factor. Thus, it appears that a case can be made for conducting
serious empirical study of the discouraging effects on consumption and investment of
a tax surcharge on high-income families.
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GLS FRAMEWORK FOR THE RE MODEL
We start with a model
yit = ρ yi,t–1 + β ∼ ′x ∼ it + γ
∼ ′z ∼ i +vit,   i = 1, . . . ,N, t = 2, . . . ,T, (A.1)
where x ∼ it is a k1 × 1 vector of time-variant explanatory variables, and z ∼ i is a k2 × 1 vector
of time-invariant explanatory variables including the constant term, vit = α i + uit. 
The error term uit and the prefecture-specific effects α i satisfy
Eα i = Euit = 0,   Eα iz ∼ ′it = 0′,  Eα ix ∼ ′it = 0 ∼ ′, 
Eα iuit = 0, 
Eα iα j = σ α
2 if i = j, 
= 0 if otherwise 
Euitujs = σ u
2 if i = j, t = s, 
= 0 if otherwise 
and ρ , β ∼ , and γ
∼ are parameters of interest. For the model in this paper, x ∼ it includes
prefectural income and the call rate, and zi is an intercept term.






–′z ∼ i +vi0,    i = 1, . . . ,N, (A.2)




t=1x ∼ it. The GLS estimates for equations
(A.1) and (A.2) are given by                   T
N –1 N
δˆ




where δ = (π∼
–′ i, γ
∼
–′, ρ , β ∼ ′, γ
∼ ′ ),
 x ∼ i z ∼ i 0      0     0
 0    0 yi0 x ∼ ′i1 z ∼ ′i
X i =  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 ,
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 0    0 yi,T–1 x ∼ ′iT z ∼ ′i
 σ
2
v0 r01 ... ...r0T 
 r01 σ u
2 + σ α
2 σ α
2 σ α
2  V =   ,
 . . . σ α
2 ...   ...                
 r0t σ α
2 σ u
2 + σ α
2
since V(vit) = σ u
2 + σ α
2, E(vitvis) = σ α
2 for t = 1, 2, . . . ,T, and y
∼
i = (yi0, yi1 . . . . yiT)′.
20 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/APRIL 2002To obtain the initial values for the implementation of the GLS estimation, we first
take the first difference of equation (A.1), obtaining
yit – yi,t–1 = ρ (yi,t–1 – yi,t–2) + β ∼ ′ (x ∼ it – x ∼ i,t–1) + uit – ui,t–1. (A.3)
Since by assumption yi,t–2 is not correlated with uit –  ui,t–1 but is correlated with 
yi,t–1 – yi,t–2, we use yi,t–2 as an instrument for yi,t–1 – yi,t–2 and estimate β ∼ and ρ by the
instrumental variable method.
Second, we substitute estimated β ∼ and ρ into
y –
i – γ y –
i,–1– β ∼ ′ x ∼
–
i = γ
∼ ′z ∼ i + α i + u –
i, (A.4)
to estimate γ
∼ using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, where y –
i, x ∼
–
i, and u –
i are
averages taking over T for prefecture i.
We then can estimate σ u





t=2[(yit – yi,t–1) – ρˆ(yi,t–1 – yi,t–2) – βˆ
∼ ′ (x ∼ it  – x ∼ i,t–1)]
2
σ u








i – ρˆy –
i,–1– βˆ





α = ————————– – – —σˆ 2
u. 
NT
To obtain estimates of σ
2
v0 and the covariance between vi0 and vit, we can first 
use the OLS procedure to estimate equation (A.2) cross-sectionally, then use the 
estimated error sum of the squares to estimate the initial variance σ
2
v0. To estimate the
covariance between vi0 and vit, we first plug in the estimated ρ , β , and γ into equation
(A.1) to estimate vit, then estimate the covariances by
∑
N
i=1(vit – v –
i)vi0 r0t = cov(vi0, vit) = ——————.
N
APPENDIX 2: MINIMUM DISTANCE ESTIMATION (MDE) 
FOR THE FE MODEL
We take the first difference of equation (A.1) to eliminate α i, obtaining
t = 2, 3, . . . ,T
∆ yit = γ ∆ yi,t–1 + β ∼ ′∆ x ∼ it + ∆ uit,                               . (A.5) i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
Equation (A.5) is well defined for t = 2, . . . , T but not for t = 1, since yi,–1 is not
available. The marginal distribution of ∆ yi1 conditional on ∆ x ∼ i, can be written as
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where π∼ is a (T – 1) × k1 × 1 vector of unknown coefficients that in general varies
independently of the variations of β and ρ , and ∆ x ∼ i = (∆ x ∼ ′i2, . . . ,∆ x ∼ ′iT)′ .
7 We consider







2 exp –—∑ ∆ u ∼ i*′ Ω
–1∆ u ∼ i* (A.7)
 2  i=1 
where
∆ u ∼ i* = [∆ yi1 – b* – π ∼ ′∆ x ∼ i1, ∆ yi2 – γ ∆ yi1 – β ∼ ′∆ x ∼ i2, . . . ,∆ yiT – γ ∆ yiT–1 – β ∼ ′∆ x ∼ iT]′ , 
and
 w –1     0      ... 0         
 –1    2     –1     0    ... 
Ω = σ u
2  0     –1     2     –1     ...  = σ u
2Ω *,
 . . .. ..    –1
 0                     –1     2     
1 where w = —– var(∆ yi1).
σ u
2
The MLE estimator is highly nonlinear. A simple but less efficient estimator of
equations (A.5) and (A.6) is to estimate θ ∼ = (γ , β ∼ ′ )′ by minimum distance estimation
(MDE):
γˆ N –1 N
θ ∼ˆ = () = [∑ ∆ Zi′Ω *








 1    ∆ x ∼ i′ 0       0         
 0    0      ∆ yi1 ∆ x ∼ i′2  ∆ Zi =
 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.
 0     0    ∆ yi,T–1 ∆ x ∼ iT ′ 
In our estimation, to avoid the singularity problem, we use ∆ x ∼–
i′ instead, where ∆ x ∼–
i′
contains averages of each explanatory variable over time.
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